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1 Introduction
Although there are many denitions of entrepreneurship, most suggest that it
is about the discovery and exploitation of opportunities (Shane and Venkatara-
man, 2000). How entrepreneurs perceive opportunities, and utilize them to
start-up new rms and businesses has spawned a large body of literature (e.g.
Buenstorf, 2007; Casson and Wadeson, 2007; OFiet and Patel, 2008, Plummer
et al., 2007 and Ucbasaran et al. 2008).
A feature of the start-up process noted in this literature is that while there
is a large pool of latent entrepreneurs, many with highly developed human
capital, only a small proportion of them succeed in starting up a rm. This
has been explained with reference to human capital (e.g. Lazear, 2005) and the
nature (and context) of opportunities that prospective entrepreneurs face (e.g.
Blanchower and Oswald, 1998).
In this paper we take these two ideas  the human capital of prospective
entrepreneurs and the nature of opportunities to propose a novel way of un-
derstanding start-ups1 . Our aim is to make a modest theoretical contribution
to the economics of entrepreneurship, and in this respect add to our previous
theoretical contributions in this regard (see Gries and Naudé, 2010;2011). In
particular, we borrow and adapt the concept of labor market matching from the
eld of labor economics, and apply it to describe start-ups as the outcome of a
match between entrepreneurs with appropriate ability (human capital) and busi-
ness opportunities. Common obstacles to start-ups, such as insu¢ cient credit or
inappropriate regulations can then be understood as frictions in the matching
process.
In this paper we outline the core of our idea. That is, we explain the essence
of start-ups as a matching process, and identify a number of research questions
for further elaboration.
2 The Matching Approach
2.1 Intuitive Explanation
At any time in the economy there exist a number of opportunities for entre-
preneurs to start-up successful rms. These are constantly evolving, and may
spur both new rm start-ups as well as rms exits (churn). A useful way to
model this situation is the matching approach. It has been applied to various
elds in economics. Representative references for the labor market are Mont-
gomery (1991), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Acemoglu and Shimer (2000)
and Pissarides (2000).
With the matching approach we can explain empirical features of entrepre-
neurship such as constantly evolving start-up opportunities, a high exit rate
of new start-ups and the development of heterogeneous business ideas / prod-
ucts/processes (i.e. innovation). Activities are described by a failure of present
1This idea was rst proposed in a more rudimentary fashion by Gries and Naudé (2010;
2011). Here we elaborate the idea and propose its more general use in a variety of settings in
formalizing the role of the entrepreneur in economic theory.
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activities, a search for new opportunities, and the matching process that leads to
new start-up rms. A match between start-up proles (reecting entrepreneur-
ial ability) and the requirements of the market will result in a start-up. Since
the e¢ ciency of this matching reects the e¢ ciency of overcoming frictions and
information and transaction costs, the e¢ ciency of the matching process also
reects the quality of the institutional framework in this market.
2.2 Entrepreneurs
Our model distinguishes between active entrepreneurs, n and latent entrepre-
neurs u. Entrepreneurs are the creators and subsequent owners and managers
of the rms in our model. In this sense our notion of entrepreneurs corresponds
to the denition of entrepreneurship as the process of starting and continu-
ing to expand new businesses(Hart, 2003:5). As these rms come into being
through the spotting and utilization of opportunities our notion is also consis-
tent with Shane and Venkataraman (2000)s denition of entrepreneurship as
being concerned about the use of opportunities. A latent entrepreneur is a per-
son who would prefer to be an entrepreneur and who considers seeking, or is
actively seeking, an opportunity (Blanchower et al. 2001). Around 25 percent
of the labor force in OECD countries may be latent entrepreneurs (ibid. p.610).
Given entrepreneurs and latent entrepreneurs represent the total entrepreneurial
potential in the economy, E, and can be written as E = n+ u.
2.3 Opportunities
Latent entrepreneurs search for opportunities to start up a new rm. We as-
sume that available opportunities are exogenously given - i.e. opportunities
exist independently of entrepreneurs. We denote the total number of potential
start-up opportunities by 
. At any time t, there are three types of start-up
opportunity. First, there are already taken opportunities, which have resulted
in a number of active entrepreneurs and their start-ups, n. Second, there are
a number ! of unrealized protable opportunities ready for the taking by an
alert latent entrepreneur. And third, there are unrealised but idle (or yet un-
productive) opportunities available, denoted by . These may be temporary or
informal opportunities that are currently not protable. People are often forced
into these opportunities when they cannot obtain wage employment or spot a
protable opportunity as a result of either personal characteristics or external
economic conditions. The total number of opportunities for a start-up rm can
thus be written as

 = n+ ! + 
2.4 A Start-Up as a Match
A start-up rm comes into being when the entrepreneur spots and utilizes an
opportunity that matches their abilities and "business plan." The number of
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new startup rms that result from such a matching isM per period. In aggre-
gate, this matching rate or start-up rate will be determined by three factors.
The rst is the environment for doing business in the country. This environ-
ment, including the institutional framework of the economy, will determine how
e¢ cient the matching process is. For instance, an alert entrepreneur may spot
a protable opportunity, but may be prevented for utilizing it (i.e. from being
"matched" to the opportunity). The overall matching e¢ ciency in the economy
is denoted . The second determinant of the matching (start-up) rate is the ex-
tent of unrealized protable opportunities, denoted by !. This reects the fact
that latent entrepreneurs are often said to be constrained by a lack of suitable
or protable opportunities. The third determinant of the matching (start-up)
rate is the capability of the entrepreneur, specically on how intense the latent
entrepreneur may be searching for opportunities. We denote this search inten-
sity  of latent entrepreneurs u as aggregate u. It has often been noted in
the literature that the keenness and e¤ort of latent entrepreneurs varies quite
considerably. Also, as we show in the next section, there are costs involved
in searching-the greater the search intensity, the higher the cost. Given these
determinants of the matching (start-up) rate we can assume that the matching
rateM can be written as:
M = M (!; u) ;
where u denotes e¤ective search e¤orts of entrepreneurs. Throughout the pa-
per, we will assume that the rate of matches per entrepreneur and the rate of
matches per opportunity depends on the ratio of opportunities to entrepreneurs
only, but not on the size of the economy. This implies linear homogeneity of
the matching function. In case of increasing or decreasing returns to scale in
matching, the e¤ectiveness of the matching process would vary according to the
size of the economy. Although this might be reasonable to some extent, we think
that this e¤ect should not be expected to be systematic. Rather it is due to
di¤erences in the institutional and business environment of the economies, cap-
tured by di¤erences in . Further, for computational simplicity we will model
the matching-function as a Cobb-Douglas function:
M = ! (u)1  :
From this we can see that the probability of a successful new rm start-up is
M=u = m.
2.5 Optimal Search and Investment Intensity, Matching,
and Firm Failure
At the individual level, any potential entrepreneur i will have to make some
search e¤orts described by the intensity i to spot and seize up a start-up
opportunity. As we mentioned, such a search is costly. The search cost per unit
of search e¤ort is ci.
Existing entrepreneurs will have to invest a certain e¤ort  i to ensure their
rms survival. The optimal search intensity to enter the market and the op-
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timal investment intensity (e¤ort) to stay in the market will be the result of
maximizing entrepreneursnet present value.2 For simplicity we assume that
entrepreneurs are identical and all entrepreneurial ventures yield the same ex-
pected prot (net of wages). The optimization problem of a representative
entrepreneur needs to include two states: (i) the state of being a wage employed
latent entrepreneur searching for opportunities to start a business, and (ii) the
state of being an entrepreneur and trying to stay in business.
i) For the state of a wage employed latent entrepreneur, the net present
value of searching, Wi ; is given by wage income wi minus search costs ci times
search intensity iplus the extra entrepreneurial income that can be expected if a
successful opportunity is found and realized as a protable new start-up rm. If
we take Vi as the value of entrepreneurial income then the extra entrepreneurial
income can be written on average as  = V  W . This extra entrepreneurial
income is not certain - the expected average extra income is  weighted by
the probability of matching. In the previous subsection we established that
the probability of matching is mi. Since individual e¤orts a¤ect the matching
probability mi (i) for a given discount rate r we obtain
rWi = wi   cii + mi (i) 
ii) For the state of an existing entrepreneur actively working to keep the rm
going, the net present value of being an active entrepreneur Vi is
rVi = vi   i i   i ( i) 
Here the prots are vi. In order to survive in the market, the entrepreneur
would need to invest i i with e¤ort  i. These required investments reect the
transitory and dynamic nature of markets and existing institutional arrange-
ments for the rm. Despite such investments, a rm failure can still occur. We
denote the rate of rm failure by i. From the perspective of the individual en-
trepreneur i; their investment e¤orts  i may reduce the likelihood of rm failure
i which follows i = i( i),  i := @i=@ i < 0,  i i := @
2i=@ 
2
i > 0.
The above implies that the entrepreneur has the choice to extend personal
e¤ort to enhance the probability of nding a match, and to lower the proba-
bility of rm failure. They can maximize the expected income in both states
of occupation, being a wage employed latent entrepreneur still searching for an
opportunity, or being an active entrepreneur trying to stay in business. Thus
the optimal search intensity, and the optimal e¤ort to make the investments
in the business most e¤ective, will be a result of the following maximization
exercise:
max
i
: rWi = wi   cii + mi (i) 
max
 i
: rVi = vi   i i   i ( i) 
2We can also introduce unemployed persons searching for opportunities while still on wel-
fare benets, but for the sake of tractability we abstract from this possibility for now.
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From the F.O.C. we obtain an optimal search e¤ort  and optimal invest-
ment e¤ort   by using the implicit function theorem3
 =  (u; !;i; ci; ) ; with
u < 0; ! > 0;  > 0;
ci < 0;  > 0
  =   (; i) ; with  i < 0;   > 0
2.6 Aggregate Equilibrium Outcome
Assuming identical behavior across entrepreneurs we can now turn to consider
the implications for the economys aggregate equilibrium outcome.
First, we obtain the representative wealth di¤erential  of the two wealth
levels (W and V ) associated with being a latent entrepreneur (searching for
a start-up opportunity), or with being an active entrepreneur ( trying to stay
in the market). Dening the vector x = (u; !;; c; ) we obtain an implicit
relation for this wealth di¤erential:
 =
v   w + c (x)   (; )
r +  ( (; )) + m ( (x))
(1)
This equation determines the wealth di¤erential  as the present value of the
net income di¤erence of the two states. The discount factor equals the interest
rate r plus transition probabilities.
Second, we can consider di¤erences in new rm start-ups and rm failures as
describing the market dynamics for rm creation and failure in the economy. In
the long-run stationary equilibrium the number of new rm start-ups will equal
the number of rm failures. Given the probability of rm failure discussed in
the previous subsection, the number of rm failures on the aggregate level is
n. The number of matched new rm start-ups is equal to M . Hence the
dynamics of rms is _n = M   n. The associated stationary ow equilibrium
condition is:
_n = 0 , M = n (2)
Third, in order to determine the aggregate equilibrium number of start-ups
we also need to consider the dynamics of opportunities in the economy. We
suppose that these dynamics are captured by two probabilities denoted p and
q. Here p denotes the probability that protable opportunities  either lled
or vacant  become unprotable, while q denotes the probability of formerly
idle opportunities becoming protable. These probabilities may be determined
by exogenous changes including structural change, the rate and nature of eco-
nomic growth, political instability, and technological progress. Thus the dy-
namics (rate of change) in idle start-up opportunities is _ = p (! + n)  q. The
associated stationary ow equilibrium for opportunities is4
3See appendix 1.
4We use the denition 
 = n+ ! +  to substitute for :
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_ = 0 , ! = q
p+ q

  E + u (3)
With equation (1), (2) and (3) we obtain a system of three equations with
three endogenous variables (u; !;). The system is determined by informa-
tion, transactions costs, institutional features and general business environment.
These are reected by the general matching e¢ ciency ; transaction costs c in
the start-up phase, and the adjustment costs  for rm growth and survival.
Furthermore the general business environment is reected in the ability of mar-
kets to absorb new product variations 
 and the entrepreneurial potential of
the economy E.
0 = F =  ( ) (E   u)  M(!; u; ) stationary matching equilibrium
0 = G = (r +  ( ) + M(!; u; )=u)  v +   + w   c wealth di¤.
0 = H = !   q
p+ q

 + E   u supply of protable opportunities
From this system of equations we can derive Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The economy [the system of equations F, G, H ] has a station-
ary matching equlibrium solution of rm creation and rm failure, and
hence a stationary number of latent entrepreneurs u; unrealized but prof-
itable opportunities ! and a stationary di¤erential of entrepreneurial and
labor wealth , as long as qp+q
  E > 0! ! > u .
u = u (x) ; ! = ! (x) ;  =  (x)
where x = (; c; p; q;
; E; v; w) :
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Proposition 1 states that we can nd a constant number of rms in the
economy. With a stationary number of rms we can identify to what extent the
opportunities of this economy or the entrepreurial potential could be utilized.
Further, we can also determine how high the stationary wealth premium 
for a representative entrepreneur will eventually be. This type of information
reects the economys e¢ ciency with respect to entrepreneurial activities. In a
perfect market economy without frictions all opportunities are seized and there
is little need for an extra premium to become an entrepreneur. Therefore, we
describe the market as a location (or institutional framework) which may or
may not be fullling its purpose e¢ ciently.
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3 Implications and Comparative Statics
The main aim of our paper is to present the novel idea of explaining rm crea-
tion and failure as the outcome of a matching process. While we largely leave
elaborations and the application of the model to future research, we want to
illustrate how studying the comparative statics of the model can reveal the role
of the various determinants of rm creation and failure, and can generate policy
recommendations. In particular, we are interested in the start-up rate as the
percentage rate of new rms in relation to existing rms ", the survival rate as
the percentage rate of successful surviving rms in relation to existing rms ,
and the total utilization of an economys entrepreneurial potential dened as the
percentage rate of existing rms in relation to the total entrepreneurial potential
in the economy 	 = nE . For these central indicators we determine the e¤ects of
a) the general market environment and the institutional quality indicated by the
matching e¢ ciency parameter , b) information and transaction costs during
the start-up phase c, and c) investment costs to keep the rm in the market .
Finally we show that a growing economy promotes start-ups and rm survival,
and generally improves the utilization of an economys entrepreneurial potential.
We state these ideas in Propositions 2, 3 and 4. All e¤ects described in these
propositions are also illustrated in gure 1.
Proposition 2 An increasing matching e¢ ciency, d > 0, will (i) increase the
matching and start-up rate in the economy " = Mn , (ii) decrease the rate
of rm survival  = 1   ; and, (iii) improve the total utilization of an
economys entrepreneurial potential 	 = nE , as long as
q
p+q
  E > 0!
! > u (i.e. number of protable opportunities is larger than number of
latent entrepreneurs):
d"
d
> 0;
d
d
< 0;
d	
d
> 0:
Proof: See Appendix 3.
The above proposition suggests the intuitively expected e¤ects. However, the
e¤ect dd < 0may require a short explanation. An increasing matching e¢ ciency
in the start-up phase increases the protability of start-up e¤orts. Therefore,
greater e¤ort is invested in this activity than in staying in business. As a result,
the start-up rate increases and the survival rate decreases.
Proposition 3 Increasing information and transaction costs when starting-up
dc > 0, will (i) reduce the matching and the start-up rate ", (ii) increase
the e¤orts of staying in business and hence the rate of rm survival , and
(iii) reduce the total utilization of an economys entrepreneurial potential
	: As long as qp+q
  E > 0! ! > u:
d"
dc
< 0;
d
dc
> 0;
d	
dc
< 0:
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Further, increasing investment costs for keeping the rm in the market
d > 0; will (i) increase the e¤orts to start up a new rm and the start-up
rate ", (ii) reduce the rate of rm survival , and (iii) reduce the total
utilization of an economys entrepreneurial potential 	,
d"
d
> 0;
d
d
< 0;
d	
d
< 0:
Proof: See Appendix 3.
While most of the e¤ects described in the proposition are intuitively clear the
cross-e¤ects of the two kinds of cost require some explanation. If the transaction
costs of starting a new rm increase (dc > 0) it will be relatively more attractive
to stay in business, hence the relative e¤ort t ensure survival increases and the
survival rate rises. Symmetrically, if investment costs for keeping the rm in
business increase (d > 0) it becomes relatively more attractive to potentially
follow a new business idea and try something new rather than keeping the
existing rm going. Hence less e¤orts are invested in rm survival since new
ideas can be tried easily. As a result the survival rate decreases and the start-up
rate rises.
Proposition 4 A general economic expansion leading to a general increase in
opportunities 
 will (i) increase the matching and the start-up rate ",
(ii) decrease rm survival ; and (iii) improve the total utilization of an
economys entrepreneurial potential 	, as long as 0 < 1 
( )
 

 i
 i i
:5
d"
d

> 0;
d
d

< 0;
d	
d

> 0
Proof: See Appendix 4.
Figure 1 describes how the matching equilibrium can be endogenously deter-
mined. In gure 1 the entrepreneurship Beveridge curve describes the equilib-
rium relation between unrealized protable opportunities and latent entrepre-
neurs trying to match their idea to an opportunity. Hence this relation indicates
market e¢ ciency in a potential equilibrium. For instance, an entrepreneurship
Beveridge curve located more in the north-west of the gure indicates ine¢ -
ciency: Even if there are a large numbers of unrealized protable opportunities,
many latent entrepreneurs will still not be able to match their ideas to a prof-
itable opportunity. Hence, if the curve was in the north-west of the gure it
would imply increasing ine¢ ciency due to strong frictions in information and
5This condition is a su¢ cient condition and states that the external market environment
must have a su¢ ciently strong e¤ect on the probability of staying in business. That is, even if
an entrepreneur puts more e¤ort into staying in the market, this additional e¤ort has limited
e¤ects and will not strongly improve the chances of survival. This condition is also su¢ cient
to ensure the negative slope and normal reactions of the entrepreneurial Beveridge curve in
gure 1.
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Figure 1: Entrepreneurial Beveridge curve and equlibrium start-up
transaction e¢ ciency, or ine¤ective institutions, or strongly diverging interests
between customers and potential entrepreneurs in the market. The slope of the
entrepreneurship Beveridge curve describes how for given market conditions de-
creasing business opportunities drive down the number of rms in the market
n and/or drive up the number of latent entrepreneurs u in the economy.
The second curve in gure 1 is the supply curve of protable opportunities.
This curve describes the relationship between latent entrepreneurs and the sup-
ply of protable opportunities for the given in- and outow connected with
the idle (or yet unproductive) opportunities . Equilibrium in the market oc-
curs where the Entrepreneurship Beveridge curve intersects the supply curve of
protable opportunities. While gure 1 enables us to graphically illustrate the
matching equilibrium and comparative static adjustments, we can also graph-
ically illustrate how changes in the market matching process a¤ect important
economic indicators like the utilization rate of entrepreneurial potential. For
this purpose we can draw a second axis starting at the given number of poten-
tial entrepreneurs E. This axis points to the opposite direction than the u-axis
because it counts the number of active entrepreneurs. For a given E this axis
hence also indicates the utilization rate of the entrepreneurial capacity of this
economy.
4 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper is to o¤er a novel way of formalizing the processes of
rm creation and failure in an endogenous growth model setting. This is done
by considering successful start-ups as the result of a match between entrepre-
neurs and opportunities. In this matching process and the subsequent survival
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of new start-ups both entrepreneurial ability and search intensity and invest-
ment e¤ort are signicant. However, even when individual entrepreneurs raise
their search intensity and investment e¤orts, rm start-up and failure rates will
be a¤ected by institutions and the conditions for doing business. Even though
some entrepreneurs may overcome adverse conditions for doing business, many
others will not, and the aggregate utilization of entrepreneurial capacity in the
economy will be lower. Using a few comparative statics, we have illustrated
how high costs of information and transactions, adjustment and investment in
a changing market environment and deteriorating conditions for doing business
will decrease the matching (start-up) rate and increase the rate of rm failure.
The policy implications are that measures to increase the aggregate utilization of
entrepreneurial capacity in the economy need to address both the individual en-
trepreneur as well as the aggregate business environment. Business environment
reform (BER), the core of most private sector development (PSD) programmes
is clearly not enough.
If the creation and survival of new rm start-ups are an essential ingredi-
ent of economic growth and development process, then our approach o¤ers a
useful insight into the process underlying this churning of rms. Unlike other
approaches, where rm start-ups are a function of a myriad of often weakly
justied factors, factors that are treated separately from the determinants of
rm failure, the matching approach treats both the creation and the failure of
new start-ups essentially as a result of a mismatch between opportunities and
entrepreneurs - including their ability and external environment.
The model could be further elaborated to include the linkages between search
intensity and the degree to which entrepreneurship is valued in itself, as opposed
to merely being an instrument to achieve other outcomes. Future research could
investigate institutional entrepreneurship, that is to say, how individual search
e¤orts could include e¤orts to change the business environment. Finally, atten-
tion could also be given to considering how innovation and innovation policy
can assist in matching di¤erent types of entrepreneurs to specic opportuni-
ties, and to gaining a better understanding of how investors and researchers
can be matched to venture capitalists. We believe these are just a few of the
potential areas where labor economicsidea of matching can be applied to the
formalization of entrepreneurship in economic theory.
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5 Appendices
5.1 Appendix 1: Determining Optimal E¤ort Levels
Search e¤ort: Determining the optimal search e¤ort, the e¤ort function 
and derivatives:
max
i
: rWi = wi   cii + !
(iu)
1 
u

F.O.C. and S.O.C.:
0 =  ci + 
u
(1  ) M
i
; 0 >  
u
(1  )!  1i u1 
Optimal search e¤ort of each entrepreneur is determined by using the implicit
function theorem from the F.O.C. and S.O.C. We obtain
 =  (u; !;; ci; ) ;  > 0; ! > 0; u < 0; ci < 0;  > 0
Derivatives of the optimal e¤ort:
 =
i

> 0; ! =
i
!
> 0; u =  
i
u
< 0;
ci =
 1
u (1  )M2i
< 0;  =
i

> 0
Stay in market e¤ort: Determining optimal e¤ort to stay in the market,
e¤ort function  i and derivatives:
max
 i
: rVi = vi   i i   i ( i) 
F.O.C. and S.O.C.
 i    i = 0;   i i < 0
where  i := @i=@ i. From the f.o.c. and s.o.c. we obtain the optimal
strategy
  =   (; i)
with
@ i
@i
=:  i =  
1
 i i
< 0;
@ i
@
=:   =  
 i
 i i
> 0
5.2 Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1
Equations F;G;H [(1), (2), (3)] have continuous partial derivatives with respect
to all variables. As all variables are positive, and since qp+q
   E > 0 !
12
! > u, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix for the smooth function f(x; y) =
(F;G;H)(x; y), y = (!; u;) ; x = (; c; q; p;
; E; w) does not vanish:
A =
0B@  M!  
 
 
+
  (E   u)   (1  ) M
m!  mu (r + + m)
1  1 0
1CA
jAj =  (r++m)

+ 
M
!

+
  
 
+
  (E   u)     (1  )M

(
m
u
  m
!| {z }
>0
) 6= 0
So that the Jacobian matrix is invertible and the implicit function theorem can
be applied. System [(1), (2), (3)] implicitly denes the functions
u = u (; c; v; q; p;
; E; v; w)
! = ! (; c; v; q; p;
; E; v; w)
 =  (; c; v; q; p;
; E; v; w) :
Comparative statics for the system F,G,H can be performed by taking the partial
reaction from Ada = dB, with
da = (d!; du; d)0;
A =
0B@  M!  
 
 
+
  (E   u)   (1  ) M
m!  mu (r + + m)
1  1 0
1CA
dB =
0@ M d  udc  (E   u)  d0
q
p+qd
  dE
1A
5.2.1 Discussion of the Beveridge Curve:
From the rst two rows of this system we obtain the entrepreneurial start-up
Beveridge curve. The start-up Beveridge curve is in analogy to the labor market
Beveridge curve.
Total di¤erential for F :
0 =  M
!
d!   du+

(E   u)      (1  )
M


d  M

d+
u

dc
+(E   u)  d
Total di¤erential for G:
0 = 
m
!
d!   m
u
du+ (r + + m) d
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Plug in F :
0 =  M
!
d!   du+

(E   u)      (1  )
M


d  M

d+
u

dc
+(E   u)  d
0 =  M
!
d!   du+

(E   u)      (1  )
M



  (r + + m)
m
!
d!   m
u
du

  M

d+
u

dc+ (E   u)  d
Slope of the Beveridge curve: d!du
0 = (r + + m)
M
!
d! + (r + + m)du
+

(E   u)      (1  )
M



m
!
d!   m
u
du

d!
du
=
 [(r + + m) 

(E   u)      (1  ) M

mu ]
[(r + + m)M! +

(E   u)      (1  ) M

m! ]
d!
du
=

(r + + m) 

(E   u)      (1  ) M

mu

   r + + m+ (Eu   1)  um!
for 0 < 1 
( )
 

 i
 i i
as su¢ cient condition.
Location of the Beveridge curve: d!d ;
d!
d ;
d!
dc for 0 < m 
2 i
 i i
n
u :
0 =  M
!
d!   du+

(E   u)      (1  )
M



  (r + + m)
m
!
d!   m
u
du

 M

d+
u

dc+ (E   u)  d;
d!
d
=
(r + + m) (E   u)   
r + + m+ (Eu   1)  

um!
> 0
d!
dc
=
(r + + m) u 
r + + m+ (Eu   1)  

um!
> 0
d!
d
=  
M
 (r + + m) 
r + + m+ (Eu   1)  

um!
< 0
Total di¤erential for H:
0 = d!   q
p+ q
d
 + dE   du
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Appendix 3: Proof of Propositions 2, 3 and 4
da = (d!; du; d)0;
A =
0B@  M!  
 
 
+
  (E   u)   (1  ) M
m!  mu (r + + m)
1  1 0
1CA
dB =
0@ M d  udc  (E   u)  d0
q
p+qd
  dE
1A
solving for the four e¤ects of c, ; ; and 
 on the number of latent entrepreneurs
yields:
a) E¤ects on latent entrepreneurs:
du
dc
=
  u
 
24 M! +      +  (E   u)   (1  ) M

>0
m
u  m!

(r++m)
35 > 0
du
d
=
 (E   u)  
 
24 M! +      +  (E   u)   (1  ) M

>0
m
u  m!

(r++m)
35 > 0
du
d
=
M

 
24 M! +      +  (E   u)   (1  ) M

>0
m
u  m!

(r++m)
35 < 0
du
d

=

r + + m+
 
 
+
 
 
E
u   1



u
(r++m)
m
!
q
p+q
 
24 M! +      +  (E   u)   (1  ) M

>0
m
u  m!

(r++m)
35 < 0
for 0 < 1 
( )
 

 i
 i i
as su¢ cient condition.
b) E¤ects on the rate of utilization of entrepreneurial capacity:
E = n+ u for E = 1
d	 = dn =  du
d	
dc
=  du
dc
< 0;
d	
d
=  du
d
< 0
d	
d
=  du
d
> 0;
d	
d

=   du
d

> 0
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c) E¤ects on the separation rate and the survival rate:
 =  (  ( (x) ; )) ; with
 i < 0;  i i > 0;
 i < 0;  i > 0
From F we know that d!du = 1 and from G we know:
0 = 
m
!
d!   m
u
du+ ((r + + m)) d
d
du
=

(r + + m)
m
u
  m
!

> 0
d
dc
=
( )
@
@ 
(+)
@ 
@
(+)
d
du
(+)
du
dc
< 0;
d
dc
=  d

dc
> 0
d
d
=
( )
@
@ 
( )
@ 
@
> 0;
d
d
=  d

d
< 0
d
d
=
( )
@
@ 
(+)
@ 
@
(+)
d
du
( )
du
d
> 0;
d
d
=  d

d
< 0
d
d

=
( )
@
@ 
(+)
@ 
@
(+)
d
du
( )
du
d

> 0;
d
d

=  d

d

< 0
d) E¤ects on the matching rate, as the percentage of newly started
rms:
" =
M
n
Under stationary conditions ( _n = 0)M = n and hence " = : Therefore,
d"
dc
=
d
dc
< 0;
d"
d
=
d
d
> 0;
d"
d
=
d
d
> 0;
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